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There is widespread recognition that on-farm activities have social implications that 
extend far beyond the boundaries of individual farms, and that markets simply do not account 
for the off-farm social impacts of agricultural land-use practices. Extra-market costs (e.g., ground 
and surface water contamination) and benefits (e.g., open space and rural landscapes) are 
increasingly a principal consideration in agricultural and environmental policy. Many states and 
localities, for example, are actively pursuing policies to protect water supplies from agricultural 
contamination, while separately implementing incentive programs and legal protections designed 
to preserve farmland. All too often these policies are inconsistent and work at cross-purposes. 
Continued efforts to address both the positive and negative externalities associated with 
agriculture are similarly apparent at the Federal level. Most notably the recent Farm Bill, entitled 
the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIR), augmented funding for 
environmental and farmland protection provisions with the specific mandate "to maximize the 
environmental benefits for each dollar expended". Yet, although created by the same statute, 
these environmental and agrarian programs are not coordinated. Furthermore, the voluntary 
nature of these Farm Bill programs are a marked and confusing contrast to the enforceable 
agricultural best management practices mandated by the Coastal Zone Management Act, which, 
if adopted, will impose substantial costs on some farms [Heimlich and Bernard]. 
-
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Agricultural environmental policy initiatives have been bolstered by economic research 
in the last two decades that has sought to quantify the social extra-market values associated with 
agricultural practices. From a policy perspective this body of research is important. It 
demonstrates that both the extra-market costs and benefits associated with farmland and 
agricultural practices are large and, thus, warrant consideration of public policy intervention. 
For example, an early 1980's study estimated that the national off-site costs of agricultural 
erosion were conservatively estimated at $2.2 billion annually [$1985, Clark]. Economic research 
conducted in the latter 1980's suggested that agricultural contamination of groundwater may 
impose billions of dollars of avoidable costs on households and communities nationwide [Lee and 
Nielsen] Focusing instead on individual willingness to pay for environmental quality, valuation 
studies conducted at various sites over the last decade have estimated that the benefits of 
protecting groundwater from agricultural contamination ranges from $56 to several hundred 
dollars per household per annum [$1992, Boyle et al.]. Likewise, several amenity benefits 
studies of agricultural land report annual household willingness-to-pay values for protecting 
farmland in the one to three hundred dollar range [Poe]. 
Indeed, it can be argued that such research is directly related to the current set of 
agricultural environmental policies. The policy shift away from traditional concerns with on-site 
soil loss and towards off-site considerations of soil erosion was demonstrated in the Conservation 
Reserve Program and the "Sodbuster" cross-compliance provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill. This 
legislation was backed by a then emerging body of literature documenting substantial off-site 
water quality impacts associated with farmland erosion. Some more targeted water quality ­
protection initiatives were introduced in the 1990 Farm Bill, again in step with a growing body 
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of research documenting the potential social costs of agricultural contamination of ground and 
surface waters. Over the years, evaluations of voting patterns on farmland protection referenda 
and surveys of public willingness-to-pay for preserving farmland have lent support to local, state, 
and federal initiatives to prot~ct farmland. 
A critical limitation of the existing extra-market valuation literature in this area is that 
such research tends to be myopic, and points to policies that address only one side of the 
agricultural environmental relationship. Although it is widely acknowledged that farmland and 
agricultural practices provide both benefits and costs, most, if not all, of the research focuses 
exclusively on quantifying either the environmental costs or the amenity benefits of agriculture. 
This artificial compartmentalization of extra-market benefits and costs in individual research 
programs engenders unilateral policy prescriptions. For instance, based on an assessment of the 
benefits and costs of erosion control, Ribaudo et al. (1994) concluded that "land retirement as a 
primary pollution control tool is expensive, but if appropriately targeted, could generate sufficient 
benefits [Le., reduced off-site costs] to outweigh social costs." A strikingly different conclusion 
was reported by Lopez et al. (1994) who examined the amenity benefits side of agricultural land 
use, and concluded that "land is under allocated to agriculture." In arriving at these competing 
conclusions, each analysis failed to account for countervailing extra-market values that might 
mitigate these findings. 
Importantly, agricultural environmental policy intervention reflects these research 
conclusions. Rather than addressing both sides of the issue in an effort to maximize societal 
-
benefits of land use, policy making at all levels has tended towards developing disconnected, and 
often incompatible, agricultural environmental policies. Frequently these policies seem to work 
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at cross-purposes. One set of policies strives to minimize the off-site costs by modifying 
agricultural practices. A separate set of policies is directed towards maximizing the open-space 
benefits associated with farm land. As discussed previously, the fact is that both benefits and 
costs of farmland and agricultural practices are large. And, if the goal of agricultural 
environmental public policy is truly to "maximize the environmental benefits for each dollar 
expended", then both should be considered jointly. That is, instead of two separate 
maximization processes, the objective should be a net benefits maximization algorithm that 
includes both off-site environmental costs and open-space benefits as arguments2• 
Moreover, the valuation literature suggests that absolute and relative benefits and costs 
will vary widely by region and locality. Valuation research on the off-site costs of agriculture 
indicates that the costs of leaching and runoff will vary substantially across sites, watersheds, 
and regions due to differential demands for water, existing levels of contamination, and the 
number and the socio-economic characteristics of people affected. Farmland protection values 
also vary widely across studies and regions: estimated willingness to pay for farmland 
protection has been found to rise with the ratio of urban to agricultural lands in the region, the 
degree of perceived threat to agricultural lands, type of farm protected, and socio-economic 
characteristics of the affected population. Combined, the evidence strongly indicates that the 
benefit-cost ratio associated with agricultural externalities is a mosaic. In some instances the 
It is interesting to note that the broader public does not appear to separate farmland 
protection from broader "environmental" objectives. Based on their own survey and focus ­
group research, as well as that of others, Kline and Wichelns observe that the public's 
motivation for protecting farmland "reveals a belief among the public that environmental 
objectives such as protecting groundwater and wildlife habitat, and preserving natural places, 
should be important objectives of farmland preservation programs". 
2 
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benefits of protecting farmland will be deemed large relative to off-site costs. Elsewhere, this 
benefit-cost ratio may be reversed. 
One approach to accommodate this spatial variability in values would be to broaden 
existing programs through rule-making so as to make potentially conflicting policies more 
compatible. Along these lines, programs such as the locally led conservation movement being 
created around the FAIR's Environmental Quality Incentives Program might broaden ranking 
criteria beyond water quality and price considerations to attach priority to areas in which 
farmland open space is particularly threatened and valued. Farmland protection programs might 
similarly give preferential consideration to farms agreeing to follow best management practices 
as part of the easement criteria. In this manner the overall benefit maximization objectives 
could possibly be more closely approximated by coordinating potentially conflicting policies. 
However, adopting a rule-making approach without changing the underlying philosophy 
and missions of responsible agencies may prove ineffective. Performance of individual agencies 
is often measured with respect to differing goals that are often perceived to be incompatible from 
the outset: for example, the mandates of environmental or conservation agencies are evaluated 
in terms of their success in protecting resources, whereas agricultural agencies typically view 
their role as promoting the well-being of the farm community. Maintaining these strict 
delineations is likely to perpetuate incompatibilities in policies. Clearly, interagency cooperation 
and consensus among agencies and staff is needed to maximize the broad social benefits of 
agriculture. Top level initiatives, such as the establishment of an interagency task force in New 
-York State to cooperatively coordinate Farm Bill initiatives, state non-point source funding, and 
... 
Federal water acts, as well as less formal information exchange groups among staff offer a means 
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of addressing this need. 
Of a more fundamental nature, joint consideration of benefits and costs suggests a 
transformation of property rights allocations and public policies associated with these rights. For 
the most part, as indicated in the upper panel of Figure I, past agriculturally-based environmental 
policies have implicitly or explicitly tended to assign rights to agriculture (e.g., farmers have a 
"right" to use their land). Voluntary programs, cost-sharing and technical assistance, favorable 
tax incentives, and right-to-farm legislation correspond to such a rights allocation. In contrast, 
as suggested in the lower panel of Figure I, water quality and environmental policies that are 
gradually shifting their focus to agriculture and other non':'point sources of pollution operate on 
an alternative rights allocation supporting the "public's" right to clean water. Enforceable best 
management policies arising from the 1990 Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments, the 
Confined Animal Feeding Operation restrictions found in the Clean Water Act, or specific 
prohibitions on selected pesticides, demonstrate steps in this direction. Taxation of inputs such 
as those used in California, Iowa or other states, or outputs, such as the Administration's proposal 
to tax sugar produced in the Florida Everglades agricultural region, can similarly be viewed as 
allocating rights to the public by forcing farmers to "lease" access to a resource. 
Such an either/or bifurcation of rights, may no longer be an appropriate or socially 
efficient allocation. On one side, the power of agriculture to effect policy and the failure of 
voluntary programs to achieve measurable environmental progress may dictate a move away from 
an actual or presumed rights allocation to agriculture. On the other hand, economists have long 
recognized that uniform regulations are suboptimal in situations where benefits and costs ­
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Figure 1: Agricultural Environmental Property Rights Allocations and Associated Policy Options 
Implied Property Rights Allocation: Associated Public Policies 
"Private Property Rights" 
to Farmers 
Voluntary Programs 
Cost Sharing and Technical Assistance 
Right to Farm Legislation 
Tax Incentives 
<Mixed Hropertyiijgh.ts ~~:. 
~;r~"'~l~ c~,~~Bip_ . 
Targeting 
LinkAges 
"Carrot" with Threat of "Stick" 
Pollution Permit Trading 
"Public Rights" to Those Who 
Experience Contamination 
Regulations, Prohibitions 
Taxes 
have spatial variation. It is also questionable whether the public or Congress is willing, at this 
point in time, to implement programs against agriculture. Given these considerations, there is 
an impetus to develop mixed agricultural environmental property rights regimes that account for 
both the rights of farmers and non-farmers. 
The need for a mixed property rights regime in agricultural environmental issues has, 
apparently, already been recognized by some policy makers at the state and local levels. As 
suggested in the shaded portion of Figure 1, several experiments involving innovative 
agricultural environmental mixed property rights policies are being pursued at non-Federal levels. 
One promising mixed property rights approach is to connect the right to use a resource to ­
observed "thresholds" of degradation or to the potential for polluting the environment. Rather 
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than assigning farmers an unconditional right to determine agricultural practices or establishing 
that households have a right to an unpolluted resource, it is possible to make resource use rights 
conditional on observed levels of contamination or on specified input characteristics or 
combinations. Such threshold, or tiered, approaches have been adopted as water protection 
strategies in some states that have experienced pollution from agricultural resources. In the 
Central Platte Natural Resources District in Nebraska, for example, a tiered strategy combines 
monitoring and soil types to develop a sequence of restrictions that increase in severity with the 
level of observed contamination in local groundwater and the vulnerability of soil to leaching. 
In areas with low observed levels of contamination and heavy soils, farmers have the right to 
adopt a wide range of management alternatives. However, when nitrate levels in local wells 
exceed specific thresholds (e.g. 12.5 and 20 ppm) more stringent water quality protection 
regulations, such as restrictions on the timing, type, and method of fertilizer application, are 
triggered. An alternative approach has been to link regulation to thresholds on productive 
inputs. Pennsylvania's adoption of an input ratio criteria in its 1993 manure management 
legislation, which would require farms with more than two animal units per acre to develop and 
implement nutrient management plans, provides an example of such an approach. 
Targeting is also widely used in many states and priority watersheds to justify differential 
land-use controls based on specific uses or values attached to impacted resources. In this 
arrangement, the right to use resources is not universal, but rather depends upon competing "best" 
" 
uses for individual resources. For instance, more restrictive regulations, and/or greater subsidies, 
might be placed in areas where potential social costs are higher because of large population ­
exposure or use of the resource (e.g., drinking water). The New York City Watershed, which 
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is subject to filtration avoidance requirements established by the Safe Drinking Water Act of 
1986, provides an extreme example of targeting. This watershed has been subject to greater 
agricultural environmental cost-sharing efforts as well as the real threat of strict regulations on 
agricultural practices. Alternatively, the potentially threatened resource might have some other 
attribute that makes it particularly worthy of protection. Local, state, and federal levels, have 
long used the existence of high quality or threatened fisheries, pristine waterways, or scenic 
vistas to identify water bodies that need additional policy intervention. 
Financial linkages between farmland protection programs and environmental practices 
offer another mixed rights approach. Typically, farmland protection programs have provided 
financial incentives to landowners regardless of the potential environmental costs associated with 
agricultural land use, and such incentive payments are often presumed to be an agricultural 
"right". Challenging this standard approach, counties in Wisconsin have experimented with a 
Conservation Credit Initiative (CCI) program that links per-acre property tax credits to the 
adoption of an approved conservation plan. High levels of participation and widespread 
implementation of conservation methods marked an early level of success for this program, and 
offer potential for other states investigating agricultural property tax reform. While, on the 
surface, this program mirrors the conservation ctoss compliance sanctions initiated in the 1985 
Farm Bill, the CCI is, in effect, quite different. In contrast to commodity programs which have 
created incentives to plant highly erodible row crops, the property tax incentive does not send 
conflicting financial signals. 
Several other "mixed" property rights are being explored across the country as policy ­
alternatives. Voluntary programs (the so-called "carrot") with a threat of strict regulations (the 
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"stick") unless a specified minimum level of participation is reached in, say, a best management 
program are being considered in some watersheds as an opportunities for agriculture to 
demonstrate that it can solve its own environmental problems without regulation. "Bad actor" 
regulations might be applied to farms that cause fish kills or other environmental disasters, while 
allowing farms without such incidents the freedom to select from a broader range of practices. 
Tradable pollution permits within watersheds are also widely suggested as an innovative way of 
allocating limited rights to farmers to use specific inputs, while protecting the right of the public 
to a total maximum level of inputs or environmental residuals. 
Clearly there are a number of mixed property rights policy options beyond the few 
indicated in Figure 1. The intent here is not to provide an exhaustive discussion of all possible 
property right arrangements. Rather, the purpose is to emphasize that, with large, widely varying, 
and simultaneous benefits and costs associated with agricultural land use, such options are needed 
and are being developed in experiments across the country. In turn, it should be noted that this 
emergence of alternative property rights arrangements also heralds a need for innovation in the 
non-market valuation of agricultural environmental externalities. In order to best inform policy 
decisions, future research should develop more holistic approaches capable of accounting for and 
integrating the environmental benefits and costs of agriculture. With a firmer understanding of 
the available options and tradeoffs policy makers will be better equipped to accommodate the 
environmental and agricultural concerns of the general and farm populations. 
" -
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